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Abstract 
IK Norway is a company that is supplying products and solutions for the pipe and pipelines for the oil 
and gas industry. This is a very conservative industry and IK is relying on good quality in their 
products and a good reputation to be able to compete. In 2008 IK was involved in an incident on SFA 
which increased the skepticism to these types of operations. To reassure the customer that their 
operations are safe IK is constantly trying to improve the processes to reduce risk and increase the 
quality. In this process they have identified the interface between the engineering department and their 
workshop as a source of potential risk factors. By improving this interface they believe that they can 
reduce the operational risk which will satisfy the customer, but also the financial risk by reducing the 
internal errors. On the basis of this the thesis will be an analysis of this interface to find improvement 
potential in regards to overall quality in IK's operation. This will be done by looking at a prior incident 
and the improvements that where made then, and compare them with a current project and their 
operation today. The thesis will then evaluate if the systems they are using today are working and if 
there should be made further improvements. 
As a result IK has initiated this master thesis to find improvement potential in this interface, to avoid 
similar incidents to happen in the future. The thesis will look at relevant literature in project and 
interface management and it will evaluate IK's work process, communication, documentation, and 
their contribution to the interface. The thesis will also follow an ongoing project on Statfjord A to 
evaluate the performance of the improvements made after the incident, to see if they have the expected 
effect or if they need further improvements. 
The thesis concludes that IK has had a major development since the accident in 2008 but there are still 
some improvements that can be made to better the interface and to reduce the coherent risk. The key 
factors that were used in the evaluation, proved to be relevant to the performance of the interface and 
the thesis provides 7 different suggestions for improving these factors. The largest improvement 
potential was identified within the work process where lack of definition was the main issue. The 
communication could also be improved by including the mechanics earlier in the project to reduce the 
probability of errors caused by misunderstanding and lack of information will be reduced.  
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Chapter 1 
 Introduction 
 
This master thesis will look at the potential risk factors in the interface between engineering and 
workshop. IK is a company that is supplying products and solution for pipe and pipeline intervention 
for the oil and gas industry. They are relying on a good reputation and a high quality in their products 
and services to be able to compete in a pressed marked. To reassure the customer that they can deliver 
at this level IK is constantly trying to improve their operation and processes to reduce risk and 
increase the quality. In this process they have identified the interface between the engineering 
department and their workshop as potential risk factor. By improving this interface they believe that 
they can reduce the operational risk which will satisfy the customer, but also the financial risk by 
reducing the internal errors. On the basis of this the thesis will be an analysis of this interface to find 
improvement potential in regards to overall quality in IK's operation. This will be done by looking at a 
prior incident and the improvements that where made then, and compare them with a current project 
and their operation today. The thesis will then evaluate if the systems they are using today are working 
and if there should be made further improvements. 
1.1 Background 
As explained above IK is company that is supplying products and services for pipe and 
pipelines. The projects that IK are taking on are very often special cases that there are no 
standard solutions to. As a result a large part of the tools and equipment they are developing 
are specialized and customized for a specific project. This type of equipment is always related 
to uncertainty and risk. It is therefore vital for IK to take the necessary measures to reduce this 
risk as much as possible to avoid financial loss and injury to personnel. It is also important to 
reassure the customer that IK is delivering at a high level of quality. The customers are often 
reluctant to use new equipment that they aren't familiarized with and that has not been 
extensively tested. To achieve this, IK has implemented all the necessary requirements to be 
certified according to ISO 9000, which is a collection of standards that establishes and 
maintains a quality management system for the manufacturing and service industry. This is 
done to make sure that quality is present in all the steps of the project development and to 
reassure the clients that they have the necessary quality assurance measures needed to deliver 
high quality products.  
Some of the projects that IK is taking on are also very urgent, because if something brakes on 
an oil rig the consequences can be catastrophic and it is very expensive to shut the plant down 
for a longer period of time. In these cases IK are contacted to find solution and quick fixes that 
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enables the operators to start up the production as fast as possible. In these situations it can 
become very hectic and the risk of errors and miscommunication increases. Therefore it is 
important to have clearly defined interfaces and procedures to follow to make sure that the 
project is progressing as effectively and errorless as possible. 
In 2008 IK was involved in an incident on the Norwegian continental shelf where the 
operators of IK's equipment did not have the proper understanding of how the equipment was 
functioning. The result was a hydrocarbon leakage that created skepticism in the industry 
towards buying these types of solutions.  After this IK had to rebuild their reputation and 
changed the way they were operating by implementing new risk reducing measures and 
quality processes. After the incident IK identified several root causes, where the interface 
between their engineering department and the workshop was identified as one of them. IK 
therefore initiated this thesis to analyze this interface and find measures to improve their 
operation. 
1.2 Main Objective 
To increase their competitiveness in a quality and risk focused market; IK is trying to identify 
measures to reduce the probability of errors and misunderstandings in their operation. They 
have therefore identified the interface between the engineering department and the workshop 
as a source that has a large potential to reduce the risk level. On the background of this the 
following objective was defined: 
 How can the interface between engineering and workshop be optimized in order to reduce 
the risk of errors and unwanted incidents in IK? 
 
Figure 1 - Illustration of Interface 
To be able to answer this question there will be identified concrete improvement measures 
which will result in a better and more effective interface to increase the quality of the project 
execution. The improvement measures will be targeting the Pipe Intervention department, but 
where there is possibility to generalize the measures they will be recommended for other 
departments as well. 
To be able to find a solution to the main objective I have found it necessary to derive it into 
smaller secondary objectives: 
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 Create an understanding of critical factor in a project interface based on existing 
literature. 
 Describe the company and define the interface between the engineering department 
and the workshop. 
 Describe the 2008 incident to evaluate the compliance to the improvement 
measures established. 
 Evaluate the current operation based on an ongoing project. 
The secondary objectives will be accomplished by participating in IK's daily operation. 
This will ensure a good understanding of the company and good communication with the 
personnel in the engineering department and the workshop. Internal documents and 
processes will also be studied. 
1.3 Methodology 
The research strategy that has been chosen is an Abductive strategy.  This means that there 
will be taken an objective approach to get an understanding of the problem and then use 
scientific theories to explain what is observed (Blaikie, 2000). The researcher will in the 
beginning of the project follow the company to learn their way of thinking, their work 
processes and risk management. When information is gathered and an understanding is 
achieved, the project will describe the social interactions and uncover the motives. Then 
technical explanations will be established and a theory will be developed on what changes can 
be made to get a positive impact on the risk management. 
To be able to get an understanding of the performance in the interface between engineering 
and workshop, the beginning of the project was used to participate in the ongoing projects and 
to speak with people in the engineering department and in the workshop. Then there was made 
literature searches to collect relevant information from the library and in papers from online 
databases. The incident reports from the incident in 2008 were undergone as well as IK's 
quality system. 
 
Because IK is a small company it was most suitable to use interviews as the method to identify 
the different points of view. This was done to get a better understanding of the opinions of the 
workers and it would enable the project to get some feedback on how the systems are working 
in practice. 
 
There will be performed four interviews in this project. 
 
 CEO of IK 
The CEO was interviewed because he is involved in all the changes in the quality system 
and has also a good understanding of IK's organization, strategies and goals. 
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 Department Manager of Pipe Intervention 
Department manager was interviewed because he is the leader of the projects and he is 
responsible for the results and schedules in the projects in Pipe intervention. He has a lot 
of experience in project management and played a big role in the improvement process 
after the incident in 2008. 
 
 Supervisor Pipe Intervention 
The supervisor from Pipe Intervention was interview because he is the leader of the 
mechanics in the workshop and the person that has the most contact with the engineering 
department. He has a good understanding of the challenges in this interface. 
 
 
During the project a lot of time will be used in the office and in the workshop to familiarize 
with the workers and the work process at the company. Other personnel will then also be 
consulted to better understand the working conditions and to get multiple opinions. But the 
main sources of information will be the aforementioned individuals. 
1.4 Risks related to the thesis 
There are several risk factors that can affect the outcome of this project. The risk factors might 
vary during the different life cycle stages off the project. In the table below the most likely risk 
factor are presented. 
ID Life cycle stage Possible Risk Factors 
1 All stages 
  
  
  
  
  
  
I spend insufficient time on one or more stages 
2 Keeping the schedule 
3 Key information isn't in writing 
4 Sickness 
5 Personal matters prevents project progress 
6 External supervisor lacks the proper knowledge to aid in the project 
7 Internal supervisor unavailable 
8 Organizing and preparing 
  
The project is not properly defined (Lack of Constraints) 
9 Collecting irrelevant data 
10 Carrying out the work 
  
  
  
Loss of data 
11 Upper management or other key drivers show only mild interest in 
your project. 
12 Changes in IK's operational procedures 
13 Change of critical personnel 
Table 2 - Potential Risk Factors 
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1.5 Limitations 
This project is written as a master thesis for the University of Stavanger. This thesis is 
weighted with 30 study credits. The University of Stavanger states that a master thesis cannot 
be written in collaboration with other students, and that normal workload for a thesis is 30 
hours per credit, which means that the expected workload of this project will be approximately 
900 hours. 
This project will describe risk factors, improvement potential and procedures that are common 
in project interfaces. It will then concentrate on the interface between the engineering 
department and the workshop to evaluate how this can be improved based on these theories. 
The project will also limit itself to the department of Pipe Intervention but may include 
references to other department within IK. This is because there are differences in the 
operations of the departments and it would be too comprehensive to evaluate all of them in 
this thesis. Other interfaces in the company, that could be optimized, will not be evaluated in 
this project due to the time limitations. 
The following interfaces are not addressed in this project 
 External interface between customer and IK 
 External interface between sub-supplier and IK 
 Internal interfaces towards Economics, IT, HR, or other sub departments 
To evaluate the risk factors in interface between engineering and the workshop there has been 
chosen some key factors that this thesis will be focused on. These factors are: 
1. Work process 
2. Communication 
3. Documentation 
Further the project has decided to follow a project that Pipe Intervention is currently executing 
on behalf of Statoil regarding a cement plug. By following this project it will be easier to see if 
IK is following their work processes in practice and not just in theory. I will also make it 
easier to find concrete improvement measures.  
There are currently no other projects that are being executed on this or similar topics in the 
company and because of this there is no risk for overlapping work. 
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1.6 Thesis Structure  
The first part of the project will provide an introduction of the project. It provides a 
background for the project with information about the company that has initiated the project, 
why it has been initiated. It will also define the main objectives in the thesis and provide the 
necessary frames that the thesis will be working within. This part will also provide 
information on the structure of the thesis, and the methods used to execute this project. At the 
end of this chapter there will also be a short risk analysis for the possible risk factors that can 
influence the performance of the thesis. 
In chapter two there will be a general introduction to relevant literature. This chapter will 
properly define how the interface is a part of, and affects the performance of the entire system 
or project. This information will later be used as a basis for evaluating the performance of IK's 
interface and the challenges related to it. 
In the third chapter there will be a proper introduction of IK the company, the services they 
provide and products they make. One of the biggest challenges in IK's operations has been 
identified as the interface between the engineering department and the workshop. This 
interface will then be properly defined so that the thesis is able to identify all the factors that 
are affecting the performance. Then there will be presented a related case from 2008 that IK 
was involved in to illustrate the risk of not properly managing the projects and its effects. 
After this incidents there were made several improvements to the management process in IK 
to increase their overall quality and risk reducing measures.  
In chapter five a current project will be evaluated to analyze the improvements IK made after 
the incident to see if they are able to comply with the systems and processes that were 
implemented. The thesis will also evaluate to what extent these measures are increasing the 
quality of the project. At the end of the thesis, recommendations will be made on how IK can 
improve their operation to reduce the risk factors in the interface between the engineering 
department and the workshop. 
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Chapter 2 
 Literature Review 
 
In this chapter existing literature will be presented. The first subject will be system engineering as IK 
is designing complete systems for their customers, from idea to implementation. This thesis will not 
look at this whole process but it is important that the interface management is contributing to the 
performance of the system. The second subject will be human factors. In most systems one of the most 
unreliable components are the humans and it is therefore vital that these are taken into consideration as 
early in the design process as possible, because this will have a considerable influence of the 
performance of the system. In the end we will look at interface management which is one of the main 
concerns in systems engineering because the main task of the system engineer is to make sure that all 
the different parts are interacting as efficiently as possible to make the complete system better. 
2.1 System Engineering 
 
According to Kossiakoff, Sweet, Seymour and Biemer (2011) there has been an explosive 
growth in technology, after the World War 2, which made it possible to increase the 
capabilities of existing systems as well as making it possible to create new and more advanced 
systems. These where larger and took advantage of several different disciplines. This also 
made it more difficult to manage these projects, and the risk of having unexpected interactions 
between the components in the system made it more difficult to predict the performance and 
the outcomes. As a result System engineering was developed as a necessary measure to be 
able to handle these challenges. 
 
When looking at system engineering the first thing that needs to be defined is the system. 
There are many different ways to define a system. The American department of Defense 
(2001) published a book where they described a system as "an integrated composite of people, 
products, and processes that provide a capability to satisfy a stated need or objective". This 
implies that there might be a large amount of parts that interact with each other in order to 
perform a specific function. These parts might have complex and intricate relationships which 
can be difficult to identify and this makes it very difficult to predict the performance of the 
system. Chapanis (1996) states that one of the aspects of systems that is disagreed upon, is if 
the human is a part of the system.  The human can either be outside the system and providing 
input or it can be inside and participate as an integrated part of the system. Kossiakoff, Sweet, 
Seymour and Biemer (2011) believes that the human component should be excluded from the 
system, because defining it as something that has been engineered is more applicable to the 
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term of system engineering. According to Chapanis (1996) it is common to include the human 
in the system when talking about human factors. This is in my opinion the right thing to do, 
because the human is a big part of the system and has a considerable impact on the systems 
performance. The human capabilities and limitations should therefore be taken into 
consideration when the system is designed. 
 
The purpose of system engineering is to help manage the engineering of large and complex 
systems (Kossiakoff, Sweet, Seymour, and Biemer, 2011). This is a very simplistic way of 
looking at system engineering and there are several aspects that are not captured. Chapanis 
(1996) emphasizes that systems are designed to meet a human need and system engineering is 
the process of evaluating and understanding the needs that the system is meant to satisfy. 
System engineering focuses on the system as a whole and the system engineer will take a step 
back and look at the function of the system and the external factors like how the system is 
interacting with the environment.  
 
The system engineer bridges the traditional engineering disciplines (Kossiakoff, Sweet, 
Seymour, and Biemer, 2011). This means that the different parts of the system might be 
designed by different people that might have little or no understanding of the function or 
physical properties of the other parts in the system. From an engineering point of view it is 
easy to only think about the technical solutions but Rhodes and Hastings (2004) explains that 
system engineering also has to take into consideration the human, social, and industrial 
context. This can often lead to interference between the parts and this is the system engineer's 
job to avoid. A system engineer can be compared with a conductor of an orchestra. The 
conductor has the overview of the whole orchestra and can hear the sounds from all the 
instruments, and how they interact. The person that plays the violin might only be able to hear 
the instruments that are closest to him because they are playing so loud. This makes it difficult 
for him to know if his contribution is adding value to the system as a whole. It is therefore 
important to have a conductor that can guide all the participants in the system, so that it 
performs as well as possible. The system engineer will not only manage the communication 
between the components of the system but he will also participate in the conceptual 
development of the system, and in this way make sure that the system is satisfying the 
customer needs. 
 
An important part of system engineering is standardization. Lamb and Rhodes (2007) explains 
that standardizing a process is a way of breaking large and complex systems into smaller 
pieces and specify who needs information and how is it distributed. They also state that system 
thinking is best learned by experience, which means that the engineers with less experience 
have a disadvantage. To accommodate this standardization is a good tool as it guides them 
through the necessary steps to enforce and develop system thinking. Standardization makes it 
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possible to identify the best practice and make that the standard procedure, which results in a 
more effective operation. Lamb and Rhodes (2007) explain that opponents to standardization 
will state that standardization kills flexibility and creativity. This may be the case, but in my 
opinion this can be avoided by making sure that the standardized processes doesn't dictate how 
the steps should be solved, but rather define what steps needs to be taken. The benefits of 
standardization are according to Lamb and Rhodes (2007) a consistent design without 
variations and opportunities for different interpretations. Standardization will also promote 
learning, as best practices and previous mistakes are recorded and implemented in the standard 
to make sure that the operation becomes as effective as possible in the future.  
 
One of the main processes in system engineering is the risk management. Kossiakoff, Sweet, 
Seymour, and Biemer (2011) explain that in system engineering it is vital to balance the risk 
with the use of new technology. New technology is necessary because it enables the system to 
satisfy needs that hasn’t been possible in the past, and it might also be necessary to avoid the 
competitors from outperforming your company by making better and more advanced products. 
The use of new technology also introduces more risk into the system and therefore it is 
important to find a balance of new technology and proven components. The risk which is 
introduced by new technology can be controlled by development and testing. 
 
According to the American department of defense (2001) it is common in systems engineering 
to look at the complete life cycle of the system. This means that System engineering is an 
exercise that follows the project from the identification of customer needs, through the entire 
life cycle of the system, to the decommissioning. This is a very large subject 
which stretches way outside the limits of this thesis. The thesis will therefore be limited to the 
design and operational phase and how to reduce the risk of product failures or human errors. 
 
2.2 Human Factors in System Engineering 
According to Jones (1995) the most important component of any business is the human, but at 
the same times its main weakness. The humans are very flexible and are able to make rational 
decisions in situations where they are not familiar. Jones (1995) states that even in the most 
advanced and automated systems there is still a need for a human component to make 
decisions or to supervise. On the other hand the human is also the most unreliable component 
of the system and is most likely to make mistakes.  
 
The international ergonomics association (n.d) defines Human factors as "the scientific 
discipline concerned with the understanding of interactions among humans and other elements 
of a system, and the profession that applies theory, principles, data and methods to design in 
order to optimize human well-being and overall system performance". This is a relatively 
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complicated definition, but Chapanis (1996) has a slightly simpler on. He defines human 
factors engineering as "the application of human factors information to the design of tools, 
machines, systems, tasks, jobs, and environments for safe, comfortable and effective human 
use".  This means that knowledge about human strengths and limitations are taken into 
consideration when the designing systems containing people, equipment, and their 
environment. As a result we can design systems that inflict less stress on the operators and 
reduce the probability of them making mistakes. 
 
Jones (1995) explains that there are two main ways that humans can contribute to risk, which 
are "active errors" and "Latent errors". Active errors are errors that can be observed instantly, 
which means that the system is operated based on constant feedback from the operator to 
control the system. Examples of this could be when you are driving a car and press the gas 
pedal instead of the breaks. This will make the car speed up instead of slowing down and you 
will get an immediate feedback that you have pressed the wrong pedal. In worst case this 
could result in an accident if you hit the car in front of you. The other type of error is "Latent 
errors". These types of errors will not be as easy to discover as the results are not visible to the 
operator immediately. An example of this could be if the operator at an oil plant is using the 
wrong kind of corrosion inhibitor. This will not be discovered until the pipes are inspected and 
the corrosion has started to tear on the pipe walls, or if the pipe starts to leak. According to 
Jones (1995) this type of error is also more commonly made by managerial personnel, as the 
consequences of their decisions will not be evident until later when the result can be measured. 
 
To avoid this the systems are designed to make sure that humans are not allowed to make 
mistakes or compensate for the mistakes, however Jones (1995) reminds us that the system 
designers can only design against the error modes that they are aware of. The easiest errors for 
the designer to anticipate are the active errors; because the errors are immediate they will most 
likely occur during the testing of the system. The system is defenseless gains the errors that 
the designer didn't know of. These are in most cases the latent failures that might be highly 
unlikely and dependent on a chain of events to be initiated. Jones (1995) says that "Well 
defined problems yield well defined solutions. The trouble is that accidents are caused by an 
interlocking web of mostly latent errors". Each latent error might not be able to make the 
system fail on its own, but when a series of latent errors is combined it can have unwanted 
effects. In order to identify these risks at an early stage of the project there are several tools 
that can be used. Chapanis (1996) mentions Fault tree analyses and FMEA as good methods 
for this task.  
 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
A fault tree is a logical diagram which gives an overview of the events and relationships that 
could lead to an unwanted event. Aven (1991) says that a Fault tree analysis is used to identify 
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all the possible combinations of events that could lead to a system failure. By doing this the 
engineers can implement measures that reduces the probability of these events to happen or 
completely design them out of the system. Fault tree analysis is a top down approach which 
means that it identifies all the top/unwanted events that can happen and then works its way 
down by looking at all the possible events that can trigger this incident. The fault tree is not 
limited to the components in the system but can also include human errors and external loads. 
This is a common method to use in incident investigations where an unwanted event has 
occurred and the root causes needs to be identified.   
Chapanis (1996) explains that the product of the fault tree analyses is the root causes of an 
unwanted event and the probability that this chain of events will happen. This will help the 
designer in prioritizing the criticality of the events by identifying redundancy in the system 
and the probability that each event will happen. As a result the resources can be used more 
effectively by concentrating on reducing the probability of the chain of event that will have the 
most impact on the overall risk of system failure.  
 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
A Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is a design tool for looking at all the possible 
system, subsystem and components to identify failure modes and their effects. In some cases 
the analysis can be extended to include a criticality analysis (FMECA). Chapanis (1996) 
describes failure modes and effects analysis as a method for identifying how the failure of one 
or more components and their probability would affect the performance of the system. The 
FMEA is usually performed in the beginning of the project to make sure that it is possible to 
use the information of the analysis to reduce the risk of failure, but it should also be a dynamic 
document that is updated through the design process. The main purpose of doing a FMEA is 
early identification of critical failure modes so they can be eliminated before it becomes too 
late or expensive to correct it. FMEA provides a documented method for choosing a concept 
for your system that has the highest probability of success. 
 
The analysis is performed by identifying all the possible ways that the components in the 
system could fail. Chapanis (1996) explains that in the case of human factor these errors often 
occur in the interaction between the system and the operator. Therefore it is important to 
identify all the errors could be made by interacting with either the system or subsystems. Then 
these errors are assigned probabilities and consequences. In the end you would have a list of 
vital interactions that could potentially damage your system or subsystems. These can be taken 
into consideration when the system is designed by completely removing the interaction, or by 
reducing the probability of them occurring. According to Chapanis (1996) it is almost 
impossible to predict all the types of errors that the human can introduce into the system, and 
it is therefore very difficult to design against them. However the procedure will usually be 
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very effective at identifying a number of errors and eliminates error inducing features in the 
system. 
 
Leveson (2002) reminds us that such event-based models can be misleading as they omit 
accidents that don't involve component failure at all. In some cases the component can have 
undesirable behavior in relation to the overall system even if it satisfies all of the components 
requirements. This is important to keep in mind when performing the risk analysis but the 
event-based models are still very good at identifying and reducing the risk factors that are 
caused by component failure.  
 
Jones explained (1990) the purpose of the risk management is to deal with calculated risk to 
gain an engineering oversight. By using adequately time and resources in the beginning of the 
project to properly define the challenges and risks, it is possible to properly define the 
requirements and to implement solutions that will compensate for or remove issues at an early 
stage. But as explained earlier the complete life cycle of the system has to be taken into 
consideration to be able to discover the potential issues that might create problems in the long 
run. Chapanis (1996) explains that this is also important to look at the human interactions that 
are made throughout the lifetime of the system and that people are interacting with a system in 
three different ways. These are as designer, users, and maintainers, which all have an inherent 
possibility of introducing both active and latent mistakes into the system. Ideally the same 
person would perform all of these tasks, because then he would have a proper understanding 
of how the system works and how it should be operated and maintained. This is often not the 
case and the different tasks are executed by separate people. This requires proper training of 
the personnel that interacts with the system, to make sure that they have the necessary 
understanding of the operations they are performing and that they are familiar with the 
consequences. It also demands good communication and documentation which ensures the 
flow of information to all participants. 
 
2.3 Project Interface Management (PIM) 
Morris (1989) believes that the system approach is by far the most pervasive method to 
manage larger projects. He also states that system thinking emphasizes the importance of 
viewing the system as a whole and that system thinking has proven that projects should be 
administrated as an organization. As a result it is vital to manage the project interfaces. The 
reason for this is that interface management will identify the subsystems that needs to be 
managed, the interfaces between them that requires attention, and the way these interfaces 
should be managed successfully.  
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Wu, Wang, Shu and Zhang (2009) explain that the main goal of interface management is to 
improve the efficiency of product development or innovation. This is a very relevant way of 
looking at it in this thesis, but a more general definition is stated by Berger and Kelly (2005). 
They describe interface management as a method for ensuring that the communication and 
operation in a project are as timely and effective as possible. This includes both oral and 
written communication between all the participants of the project. Because of the human 
factor is a significant part of the communication, this is one of the biggest sources of 
misunderstandings and lack of information and requires careful management and coordination. 
 
According to Morris (1989) the main interfaces in a project can be found between the different 
life cycles of the project. He explains that there are four main life cycle stages which are the 
Prefeasibility/feasibility stage, the design stage, the manufacturing/assembly stage and the 
operational stage. At each side of these stages the project differs dramatically in objective, 
operation and scale. This also means that the operation is very different and has different 
needs of management. In this thesis we will look specifically on the interface between the 
design stage and the manufacturing/ assembly stage. 
 
Morris (1989) states that interface management is not a well-documented theory and that it is 
more a way of looking at project management and the implementations measures are mostly 
illustrative. Berger and Kelly (2005) on the other hand have a little more specific approach. 
They explain that the first step in interface management is to make clear and concise job 
descriptions. After this the next step is to evaluate the interfaces to see if they are performing 
satisfactory, or if there is unexploited improvement potential. The last step is to establish 
standard protocols for critical communications. This will bridge the gaps and challenges that 
are uncovered in step two. This removes the uncertainty around the limitations of the different 
roles, and who is responsible for the required processes. This also clarifies the chain of 
command which makes it easier for the employees to know who to consult when decisions 
need to be made. 
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Chapter 3  
IK – The Company 
 
IK was established in 1987 and is a niche supplier 
of solutions, products and services for subsea, pipe 
and pipelines, focusing on the worldwide oil and 
gas industry. IK comprise of the following 
departments; Subsea, Field Service, Pipe 
Intervention, Torque and Calibration, and Pigging 
Products and Service.  
Their main office is located in Forus, outside 
Stavanger, where they have an engineering office, 
workshop, storage facilities and a calibration 
laboratory.  IK also have a manufacturing facility in Newton Aycliffe (IK-UK) where they 
produce pigging products and plugging tools, and a department in Saudi Arabia (IK-Saudi) 
which is currently under incorporation. 
This project is initiated by the department of Pipe Intervention (PI) which is located in Forus. 
PI is making customized solutions for operation and lifetime extension on hot and cold 
systems in the offshore industry. Typical operations are: 
 Pipe intervention services 
 Hot tap services 
 Line stopping services 
 Delivery of repair and tie-in clamps 
 Cutting and machining services 
 Freeze plugging 
The main purpose of these operations or 
services is to create solutions to problems 
on offshore or onshore installation which might cause an unplanned shutdown of the 
operation. The main alternative to IK's services is to shut down the plant and make a proper 
repair to the system. This is more time consuming and therefor very expensive. IK can supply 
a very quick solution that will keep the operation running until the next planned shutdown. 
Their biggest market is on the aging offshore installation on the Norwegian continental shelf, 
where the oil rigs are long outliving their initial design life. Life extension is very challenging 
Figure 2 - IK-Norway main office in Forus, 
Stavanger 
Figure 3 - Illustration of a hot tapping procedure 
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but is very beneficial to the operators. It is therefore an increasing demand for the types of 
services that IK provides. 
1.2 IK's Challenges 
IK is a relatively small company which has found a niche in the oil and gas industry with a 
high demand. As a result they are expanding rapidly and constantly needs to improve their 
management to accommodate the challenges that come with. Because of this it is vital that IK 
continuously improve themselves, to make sure that they constantly are in control of their 
risks. 
To be able to compete in the oil and gas industry it is vital to have a good reputation in regards 
to health, safety and environment (HSE). This is the main issue that the oil companies are 
concerned about in addition to the costs. This means that IK needs to convince the customers 
that they have the required tools to be able to execute a project at a high level of quality, at a 
high speed, and to a low price. To be able to do this IK must have an effective project 
management and reduce the number of mistakes in their operation. This can be clearly 
reflected in IK's company values, which are shown in the table below.  
One of the biggest contributors to increased cost and inability to meet deadlines are errors 
which cause corrections and rework. According to Chapanis (1996) this is most often caused 
by human errors, because it's not easy for one person to understand something that is designed 
or explained by someone else. This is why this thesis has been initiated to reduce the risk in 
the interface between the engineering department and the workshop. As shown in the table 
below this thesis will support several of IK's values and help them execute their projects in a 
way that will support their overall goals. 
IK Values  
Customer in focus  
Quality and Safety inherent in products and operation X 
Efficiency & result driven from design to execution X 
Highest ethical standards, values & integrity  
Courageous and Hands-on  
Openness in communication X 
Table 3 - Thesis relations to IK values 
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 The project is supporting IK's goal of having quality and safety inherent in all products 
and operations, by making sure that there is good communication between the 
engineer that designs the products and procedures and the mechanics that builds, tests 
and operates them. 
 The project is supporting IK's goal of being efficient and result driven from design to 
execution, by directing attention to possible issues that can reduce efficiency and 
result in redesign. It is much more cost and time effective if you only have to do things 
once.  
 The project is supporting IK's goal of openness in communication because it is 
addressing the communication and interaction between several interfaces in the 
project. 
 
1.3 Engineering – Workshop Interface 
IK has established that the interface between engineering and workshop is the most critical to 
their operation. By improving this interface they believe that they can significantly contribute 
to reducing their overall risk. This is not a big interface in the sense that there are many 
contributors, but it's a significant interface because the project is managed very differently on 
both sides. Pipe Intervention only has 8 employees which are distributed on the following 
roles. 
Title Number 
Department manager 1 
Project Manager 1 
Project Engineer 3 
Supervisor 2 
Mechanics 1 
Total 8 
Table 4 - PI Employees 
At this point I will not describe the complete work load of the employees but I will try to 
establish their main contribution to the workflow in a specific project.  
Department manager 
The department manager is the owner of the project. He has lots of contacts in the industry and 
works as the departments face outwards. He is often the one that is initially contacted by the 
customer to evaluate the problem and decide if it is possible to find a solution. 
Within the project the department manager mainly function as an engineering specialist. He is 
the brain behind the big projects and develops the concepts and solutions for the problems. 
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This is done in collaboration with the project engineers as well, but it is the department 
manager that makes the final decisions. He will follow the projects to the end but is only 
working on concepts, problem solving and testing. The detail design is left for the project 
engineers. 
Project Manager 
The project manager has responsibility for progress of the project and to make sure that the 
stated goals are accomplished. He needs to make sure that the needs of the client are met and 
at the same time manage the cost, time, scope and quality of the project.  
He is also controlling the workload of each of the workers in the project. He assigns projects 
and tasks to both the project engineers and the mechanics in the workshop. This makes him 
one of the biggest contributors to the interface between engineering and workshop. 
Project Engineers 
The project engineer's main responsibility is to make the detailed design. They will also 
participate in the development of the concept itself but it has to be approved by the department 
manager. When the concept is chosen then project engineer will create the design or the 
solutions that is required for the concept to work.   
The project engineer will mostly communicate with the department leader about technical 
solutions and the project manager about time schedules, costs and other administrative 
subjects. 
Supervisor 
The Supervisor is the customers main contact point when a project is being executed offshore. 
It is he who leads the job and is responsible for making sure that procedures are followed and 
that tasks executed correctly. Onshore there is in practice less difference between the 
supervisor and the mechanics.  
Mechanics 
The mechanic performs regular tasks in the workshop, like putting together assemblies and 
creating test rigs. He also performs necessary machining, to make small parts, or to modify a 
part that doesn’t have the correct dimensions. 
1.3.1 Organizational Interface 
If you look at the Pipe Interventions from a strictly human resources point of view the 
structure of the department would look like the figure below. As we can see the department 
leader is on top. He is the owner of all the projects and is responsible for the human resources, 
and the project manager is subject to the department leader. 
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Figure 4 - Organizational Structure 
This image changes if we go into a specific project. Within the project the department 
manager works like an engineering specialist, and are a resource which is managed by the 
project manager. The hierarchy will then look more like the figure bellow. 
 
Figure 5 - Project Structure 
For this thesis I will use the hierarchy within the project as a reference because this is the one 
that is most relevant when evaluating the interface between engineering and workshop. 
 
Communication 
One of the main advantages with a small department is that it is very easy to communicate 
together. The reduced distances make it easier to walk over and talk to a coworker, which will 
reduce the threshold for retrieving information. The close cooperation also allows the 
employees to get to know each other on a personal level. This reduces the risk of 
misunderstanding each other and makes the communication flow better. 
There is one minor restriction of communication. This is the interface between the engineering 
department and the workshop. The workshop is located very close to the engineering office, 
which makes this less of an issue than for other companies. The quality of this communication 
will also vary with the specific employees who are communicating. Because the department is 
so small, communication is made between all the participants in the project, but in the figure 
bellow I have illustrated the main communication channels.  
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Figure 6 - Interface between workshop and engineering 
 The department leader is functioning as the engineering specialist within the project. Most 
of his communication will be between him and the project engineers or the project 
manager.  
 The project engineer is mostly communicating with the department leader and the project 
manager, but also has some communication with the supervisor. This is shown in a dotted 
line because the amount of communication might vary with the projects and the specific 
personnel involved. 
 The Project manager is the center point of the information flow. He communicates with all 
the participants in the project to make sure that they are performing the right tasks, at the 
right time, and have the proper information.  
 The supervisor will in most cases communicate with the project manager which provides 
him with tasks and schedules. There will be some communication with the project 
engineers as well but this is a less formal communication channel. 
 The mechanics will in most cases communicate with the supervisor but in some smaller 
projects he will adopt the role as supervisor. He will then go through the same information 
channels as the supervisor. 
 
1.3.2 Scope of Interface 
One of the main advantages of IK is their flexibility. They are able to take on a large specter of 
projects, from small routine operations to large complex project where completely new 
equipment needs to be developed. This also means that the number of participants in the 
project, and the project process varies.  
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In IK they have roughly divide the projects into two: 
 Small Projects 
The small projects are routine operations that IK has performed several times and that 
requires minimal of design and modification. These projects have a cost less than 
1.000.000 NOK. 
 Large projects  
The large projects are much more comprehensive and require more documentation and 
analysis. These projects typically cost more than 1.000.000 NOK.  
After the incident in 2008 there was a big change in how IK managed their projects. The 
biggest difference was that they implemented a project management system to assure a high 
level of quality in the projects (Appendix B). This project management process has been 
through several revisions and has become very comprehensive. 
This process works very well with the larger projects with a big budget. In these projects they 
have the proper resources to complete the amount of documentation and analysis required in 
their management system called Antenor Management System (AMS), which will be 
described later in the thesis. This is important because these projects have the highest risk for 
the company, with regards to both revenue and reputation.  
IK also has a lot of small standard procedures which they have done several times and are 
considered almost routine operations. In most cases there will be made some small 
customization for each project, but not to the extent that it's considered a new design. The 
smaller projects with smaller budgets and timelines can't complete the whole AMS process, 
because it is too extensive. These types of cost can't be justified to the customer; hence some 
of the steps in the project process will be omitted.  
1.3.3 Documentation Interface 
IK has also very clear guidelines for what documentation the projects require. The AMS 
system defines the requirements for documentation and at what point in the project these 
documents should be made. The AMS also links to the location of the templates that should be 
used for this purpose. These templates include all the headlines and information about what 
content should be filled in and where. This makes it very simple for the engineers that are 
working on the project to find the proper document and to fill in the necessary documentation.  
By using this system the quality of the documentation increases and there are made less 
mistakes. The information will have the same format every time which makes it easier for the 
employees to find the information they need, because it is in the same place every time. This 
will also reduce the time used to find information and will also make it easier for the person 
who is revising the document. Another advantage of using these templates is that you ensure 
that all the necessary documentation is created and that nothing is forgotten. If the documents 
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were to be made from scratch every time, there would be a high probability that something 
was forgotten, neglected or deemed unnecessary. As a result the risk of mistakes and incidents 
would drastically increase. 
IK has also made another step to ensure the quality in their documentation, by making sure 
that all issued documents are properly reviewed. This will ensure quality of the document and 
provide credibility with the customer. Every document or drawing that is created by a project 
engineer, needs to be peer reviewed by a qualified person that works within a relevant field 
before it can be approved for release. The approval for release is a formal way of ensuring that 
the document has been reviewed and the person that has reviewed has the required expertise to 
do so. It is ideally done by a third person, however in PI which is a small department, this is 
not always possible and the documents can be released by the creator of the document after he 
has made sure that it has been reviewed.  
1.3.4 Risk related to interface 
 
Compliance Risk 
In the oil and gas industry almost every activity and product development is governed by rules 
and regulations. The company needs to follow the required standards in order to be allowed to 
bring their equipment offshore and to perform their operations. Nonconformance from 
violation of rules and regulations, mandatory practices or internal policies might result in loss 
of income, fines, payment of damage, and voiding of contract. 
IK is certified according to the ISO 9001 standards which mean that they have implemented 
the necessary measure to ensure a certain level of quality. If the requirements in this standards 
would change IK would have to make changes to their operation which potentially could 
require a lot off resources to implement.  
There is also a risk of the company not following their own management process and neglect 
vital steps in the procedures. This could be caused by lack of understanding, changes in 
management or recklessness.  To avoid this routine checks are necessary, to continuously 
ascertain that the company is in compliance with the standard. 
Financial Risk 
Financial risk is a very wide term, which includes several types of risk associated with 
financial loss. This is type of risk is probably one of the biggest concerns for a company, 
because it's the economical results that creates the foundation that the company stands on. If 
the company is not able to generate the required revenues the company becomes insolvent. 
There are several ways the engineering-workshop interface can contribute to financial risk.  
If mistakes are made due to poor communication, design, or work processes this can lead to 
significant losses in both time and money. These errors are often not discovered until the 
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equipment is tested and at this point it is very difficult to make changes to the project. The 
parts that are not working needs to be redesigned, manufactured, assembled and then tested 
again. This will make a big impact on the time schedule and it will increase the cost because 
new parts need to be manufactured. By having good project interfaces the probability of errors 
can be reduced and the financial loss be minimized. When designing new equipment with 
limited experience and knowledge it is not possible to remove the risk completely and there 
will always be some uncertainty. 
Operational Risk 
The operational risk is probably the risk that the customer is most concerned about because 
that comes into play when the IK's equipment is interacting with their equipment. Therefore it 
is important that the operation of the equipment is properly defined and tested before it's taken 
offshore. If something goes wrong when the operation is performed it's vital that the operator 
knows what to do and how to handle it. He must understand how the equipment works 
allowing him to know why the equipment is behaving as it is. He should also be taught what to 
do if something does go wrong.  
The key factors relation to risk  
In order to counterweight the risk factors that has been identified in IK's operation, it's 
important to ensure high quality in their operation. In this thesis I will evaluate the three key 
factors; work process, communication and documentation to see how they contribute to the 
quality of the operation and how they can be improved to reduce the risk of errors and 
unwanted incident in the interface between the engineering department and the workshop. 
 
Figure 7 - Balancing risk and quality 
Risks Quality 
Documentation 
Communication 
Work process 
Financial risk 
Operational risk 
Compliance risk 
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Chapter 4 
 2008 Incident 
 
In 2008 IK was involved in an incident on the Statfjord A platform, where hydrocarbons 
leaked out into one of the legs and created an explosive atmosphere. This was a severe 
incident that could have had very high consequences and both Statoil and the petroleum 
authority have created an incident report. This accident has to some extend damaged IK's 
reputation and created some skepticism in the industry to the use of hot taping operations.  
 
According to Statoil's investigation report (2008) the accident was triggered in conjunction 
with a project that Statoil initiated in 2004 where they planned to remove some redundant 
pipes in the utility shaft on the Statfjord A platform. These pipes where located in the utility 
shaft approximately 61m above the sea bottom.  
 
Figure 8 – SFA, location of the leak in the utility shaft 
The pipes that where going to be removed were part of a system that was used to pump sludge 
form the oil /water contact in the ballast tanks. The sludge-lines where in direct contact with 
the storage tanks and was tied in to an open drain manifold. These pipes were never used but 
as long as the pipes were filled with hydrocarbons they presented a potential risk of leakage 
due to constant deterioration from corrosion. Statoil decided to remove these pipes in order to 
reduce the risk and to minimize maintenance. The picture below is taken from Statoil's 
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investigation report and shows, in red, the open drain manifold that needed to be removed. To 
avoid stagnant hydrocarbons in the remaining pipe it was decided to cut it at the location of 
the stapled red line in the picture below. 
 
Figure 9 - Illustration of where the piping were going to be cut 
 
Statoil hired Aker Solutions ASA to be the supplier for this project with all its responsibilities. 
In the summer of 2004 Aker created a study for conducting removal of the sludge manifold 
and associated equipment (Førland et al. 2008). In this solution a freeze plug is mentioned as a 
possible solution but this is denied by Statoil. It is then decided that hot tapping is the best 
alternative for this job.  
 
IK was then contacted to create a study of a possible solution for hot tapping and removing the 
sludge manifold. This study was completed and submitted 20.02.2006 and it was decided that 
IK will perform the operation and an order was placed 13.03.2006 (Førland et al. 2008). 
 
To be able to remove as much of the pipe as possible it was decided that IK was going to drill 
though the 90 degree bent to be able to place the plug as close to the vertical pipe as they 
could, which is illustrated in the picture below to the left. Because the pipes where going to be 
cut in a 90 degree bend, there was a risk that the saw could jam if it wasn't completely 
centered. To solve this IK designed two saw-supports that where screwed into the hot-tapping 
clamp to make sure that the saw stayed centered. This saw-support is shown in the picture 
below to the right. 
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Figure 10 - The hot tapping clamp with saw-supports marked in red 
 
 
The project was executed in several phases and manifold 2 were removed in 2006 (Jacobsen et 
al. 2008). The work was halted due to some technical issues which caused some leakage 
trough the seal around the saws axel. This was fixed and manifold 1 and 3 were removed in a 
shutdown in 2007. The resisting piping was planned to be removed in 2008 (Jacobsen et al. 
2008). 
 
The incident happened 24.05.2008, when IK had drilled trough on of the pipes and they 
retracted the saw and removed the cut part (Førland et al. 2008). The next procedure was to 
insert a brush that would grind the inside of the pipe to make sure that there was a clean and 
smooth surface where the plug was going to sit. This brush was slightly bigger than the hole 
that was cut and the operator decided to retract the saw-supports to make sure that they were 
not damaged when the brush passed. During the brushing procedure one of the saw-supports 
came loose and hydrocarbons were allowed to flow freely through the 2" hole. There were 
made attempts to reinstall the saw-support, but they were not successful and the shaft had to 
be evacuated. 
  
During the incident 156 m
3
 of oil leaked out into the utility shaft on Statfjord A (Førland et al. 
2008). The hydrocarbons vaporized and created a highly explosive atmosphere in the shaft. 
Approximately 70m
3
 of oil was pumped into the sea (Jacobsen et al. 2008). The petroleum 
authority concluded that under marginally different circumstances the consequences could 
have been fatal. 
 
Statoil's report of the incident states that the initiating causes were there weren't any barriers 
that prevented the operator from screwing the saw supports too far out. IK's operators on the 
shift was not aware of the hazard of screwing the saw-supports too far out and there was not 
established routines on how to reduce the leakage if something went wrong.  
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4.1 The petroleum authority has identified the following root 
causes in their report: 
 
 Unclear responsibilities and inadequate compliance to their own management 
systems. There was and inadequate control of the risk factors that were present in the 
project, because the participants were not able to follow their own systems for 
managing responsibilities.  
 
 Inadequate risk assessment in the early stages of the planning. 
It the beginning of the project it was not properly identified that that there was 
potential for very large consequences in the operation. As a result this was also 
neglected during the risk analysis later in the project.  
 
 Inadequate use of knowledge about the technical conditions of the plant 
During the planning of the operation and risk analysis the knowledge of weaknesses in 
technical barriers were neglected. There were also no routines for ensuring that this 
was executed. 
 
 Inadequate management of competence 
There were no requirements that ensured that the personnel or leaders had the proper 
competency in relation to the plants environment and risk factors. There were also no 
routines for ensuring that the personnel met the requirements of proper competency. 
 
 Inadequate transfer of experience from previous jobs and incidents 
All relevant personnel that participated in this project have experience from similar 
incidents. The lessons learned in these incidents were not sufficiently considered 
during the planning and execution of the project on Statfjord A. 
 
 Inadequate technical development of method 
The equipment that was used was not quality assured by the members of the project 
and it wasn’t developed according to the relevant requirements and routines. As a 
consequence the vulnerabilities inherent in the design weren't identified and the 
proper barriers towards the hydrocarbons weren’t implemented. 
 
 Inadequate detail planning and approval of the job 
The detail planning was not properly executed and the precondition of lowering the 
pressure in the system prior to the operation was neglected. There was not established 
any mitigating measures since this hadn’t been taken into consideration during the 
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planning of the project. The work permit was not in compliance with the actual work 
that was planned. 
 
 Inadequate training of executing personnel 
Parts of the personnel from all of the participating companies that were directly 
involved with the execution of the project did not have the proper training in risk 
factors and the use of the equipment. 
 
 Inadequate knowledge of Statoil's managing documents 
Personnel from all of the participating companies had a lack of understanding and 
knowledge about Statoil's governing documents. The personnel's knowledge about 
these documents was not verified prior to the operation. 
 
These points are taken from the report "Gransking av hendelse Hydrokarbonlekkasje I 
utstyrsskaftet på Statfjord A 24.5.2008" (Jacobsen et al, 2008).  
 
As a result of this investigation the petroleum authorities issues a warning to IK which states 
that: 
 
"IK is required to identify and execute measures to improve their management of activities, 
including compliance with applicable requirements for development and qualification of 
equipment and procedures, securing the necessary competence of personnel and identification 
and management of risk in execution of assignments.  
 
IK must have complied with these requirements within 01.12.2008. The authorities must be 
notified when these corrections have been made." 
 
The complete warning can be seen in appendix A 
 
4.2 In Statoil's incident report the root causes related to IK's role 
in the project are: 
 
 IK didn’t follow rules/procedures/ and good work practice 
IK was responsible for the design verification and the safety evaluation of the 
equipment, in accordance to ISO9001 and the machinery regulations. IK is certified 
according to the ISO9001, which means that the company has an internal procedure 
IK-P5.1 "Procedure for Design". It is not possible to find any documentation of this 
procedure being followed when this equipment was developed. 
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During the verification of the equipment all the tests were focused on the functional 
part of the equipment and its ability to saw through the pipe and to set the plug. There 
was not executed any test to verify the equipment's reliability as a barrier. There has 
not been conducted any FMECA (Failure mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis) or 
similar review of the possible failure sources, in relation to technical or human errors 
during operation of the equipment. 
 
 Requirements and expectations for work execution were not communicated. 
IK failed to train their operators with regards to the risk of operating the saw-support. 
The risk was also not described in the operational procedure. This is probably because 
of the lack of failure identification in the design and development of the hot-tapping 
tool.  
 
The training of the personnel was only based on the presence of the personnel during 
the FAT (Factory acceptance test). Parts of the operation were also excluded from the 
FAT. Because there was no rust on the test pipes, there was argued that there was no 
need to brush the inside of the pipe in order to get a good seal around the plug. The 
operator was therefore not properly trained in this brushing procedure. 
These points are taken from the investigation report "Granskingsrapport Oljelekkasje I 
utstyrskaft på Statfjord A 24.5.08" (Førland et al, 2008). 
4.3 Improvements after the incident 
After the incident IK was required to make some changes to their operations to reduce the risk 
factors, but also to improve their reputation and reassure the customers that this would not 
happen again.  
The most important thing that IK changed after the incident was their attitude towards risk. 
Until 2008 IK was a very small player in the industry and did whatever the customer told them 
to, without asking questions. The customers were the ones with the money and the knowledge 
about the system, and if they said it was ok then IK accepted it. After the incident IK realized 
that they needed to take responsibility for their own operation and start to set demands to the 
customer. These demands were made to ensure that the operation of IK's equipment becomes 
as safe as possible and if the customer is not following these demands, IK will refuse to 
complete the operation. 
Instead of hiding the risks they started to present them for the customer. They also explain 
what measures they have taken to reduce these risks and how the customer could contribute to 
reducing the risks. If the customer fails to meet these risk reducing measures and the 
consequences would affect the safety IK would not perform the operation. If there are 
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consequences to the operators equipment, IK would warn the customer that they can do the 
operation, as long as the operator are familiar with the consequences and are willing to take 
the risk of the potential damage.  
This change in attitude is probably the change that has had the most impact on the risk related 
to IK's operation, but this is intangible and very difficult to measure. IK also made some 
tangible changes to their operation by implementing a management system, familiarize 
themselves with relevant standards, and improve the training of their operators. 
Management System 
 
 
Figure 11 - Illustration of the web based management system (AMS) 
As a result IK implemented a web based, process oriented, quality system called Antenor 
Management System (AMS). This system increased the availability of procedures and the 
consistency in the management process. It also provided a step by step manual for the work 
flow in the project, which ensures that all the vital parts of the project is executed properly, 
and in the same way every time. The roles and responsibilities of all the participants in the 
project are clearly defined and it provides the necessary templates for the documentation that 
needs to be completed. The picture above shows the mainstay of the system, where the process 
for project management is enlarged. A larger excerpt from this system can be seen in appendix 
B. 
 
Knowledge of Standards 
Before the incident IK was not very concerned about following all the standards that are used 
in the oil and gas industry. The reason was that the equipment they were using was only 
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temporary and not a part of the installation. Therefore they argued that it was not necessary 
that all their equipment should be subject to these restrictions. After 2008 this has changed and 
IK has familiarized themselves with all the standards that are relevant to equipment used on 
the Norwegian continental shelf. All their equipment shall today meet these requirements or 
higher, and goes through a qualification process. 
 
Operation and training of personnel 
IK has also changed the way their operators are trained. After the incident all the operators has 
to be present during the assembly of the equipment and the testing. This is to ensure that they 
have the proper understanding of the equipment they are operating and that they have done 
one or more test runs of the equipment before they are offshore. This will make them familiar 
of potential issues they can encounter when they are offshore, and how to handle them. If the 
personnel that perform the test are not able to go offshore the test will have to be repeated with 
the personnel that will replace the former. 
The operation will also be planned in such a way that the part of the operation that involves 
the highest risk will be executed during the day shift. This will ensure that the operators have 
good working conditions and can access necessary personnel from both operator and from the 
engineers onshore.  
If something happens offshore and the customer wants to change the operation of IK's 
equipment, then the engineers onshore need to be consulted. This procedure is meant to 
protect the personnel offshore from being overrun by powerful people from the operator. This 
is a very common situation where the operators want to change something, even if the 
operational procedure has been agreed upon upfront. To avoid that IK's operators are pushed 
to make these kinds of changes, they have to get approval from the engineers onshore, which 
makes the process a little bit more formal and difficult for the operator to push through their 
shortcuts.  
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Chapter 5  
Results and Analysis 
 
There is no doubt that IK has come a long way since the incident in 2008 and that the focus on 
health safety and environment has improved significantly. After speaking to the representative 
from DNV, who were performing the yearly revision of the ISO 9001 standard, was impressed 
with the improvements they had made. But there is always room for improvement and that is 
something IK is very committed to.   
5.1 Statfjord A permanent concrete plug 
During this thesis I have followed a project which was initiated by Statoil. This project is a 
concept study to verify a method for installing an 18" concrete permanent barrier for a ballast 
water pipe on Statfjord A. The requirements from Statoil were that they wanted to concrete fill 
an 18" pipe, which is concrete-lined and connected to one of the storage tanks. The plug must 
be reinforced with iron bars and there has to be a 2" bypass to allow some communication 
with the tank. If IK can find a solution and confirm that it works, then Statoil will buy a couple 
of these plugs to keep in storage in case they need them. 
 
To solve this IK designed a long articulated train 
carrying three hoses internally. Two of these 
hoses were used to drain water, while the third 
one was used as a bypass. At the end of the 
bypass hose there is an inflation plug. The main 
function of this plug was to create a barrier 
against the storage tank to make sure that the 
concrete are not pouring into the tank. The 
concept and test rig is illustrated in the picture. 
 
5.1.1 AMS 
After the incident in 2008 IK implemented the 
Antenor Management System (AMS). This is 
supposed to be a guide for all the steps that need 
to be made during the project process and who is responsible for the execution. This system is 
very comprehensive and well suited for larger projects that have a lot of resources and a long 
time horizon. To evaluate this system I have used the current project for the concrete plug, and 
Figure 12 - Illustration of the concept created for 
the concrete plug on SFA 
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traced the project through the project management process to see if PI was working in 
compliance with their documented procedures. 
When following the concrete plug project it become evident that the steps in this process 
hadn’t been properly completed. During the planning phase their management systems clearly 
states that there shall be created a quality assurance plan (QAP) and it is referred to the proper 
template. This document is created and the proper template has been used, but the document 
has not been completed. Several steps in the QAP have been neglected or poorly defined. One 
of the most critical steps, which are the risk register, has also been skipped. During the project 
there has been made changes to the concept, but the document has not been updated. The 
result is that some of the information which is provided in the QAP is not relevant. 
In the AMS there is stated that in the planning phase of the project there will be identified the 
necessary risk assessments. As explained earlier IK has three main risk assessments: 
1. Risk register 
2. Obligatory SJA 
3. (HAZOP, HAZID, FMECA) 
None of these three steps had been completed when the project had reached the test phase. The 
risk register was neglected in the QAP and it only refers to a separate HAZID report, but there 
has not been executed a separate HAZID report because this is usually done in cooperation 
with the customer during the planning of the operation. As this project will only prove a 
concept and not be executed offshore, at this stage, the customer has not required a HAZID 
meeting, and therefore this has not been executed. In this project there will only be done a 
FAT and the customer is not involved in the execution. This means that there has not been 
done any documented risk assessment as the project reaches its end. 
5.2 Work Process 
When the employees are addressed with these issues they are all giving the same answer. As 
explained earlier IK has a common understanding that the smaller projects that are based on 
known technology does not require the same amount of documentation and that they are to 
some extent allowed to deviate from the process in AMS. This is also verified by the CEO of 
the company. My first concern with this is that there is no clear definition to what separates 
the two types of projects, in fact there is not defined anywhere that there are two types of 
projects. This is just a common agreement which should have been implemented in the AMS. 
There should also be a proper definition on what separates these two, like to what extent there 
will be used new technology, the timeline of the project and the potential risk related to it.  
The project for the concrete plug on Statfjord A is a concept study which involves a lot of new 
technology and operational procedures. This would be a perfect example of a project that 
could have taken the full advantage of the AMS system, but this was not properly specified 
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when the project started. When confronted with this concern the employees also agree that this 
would probably be an ideal project to use the AMS procedure, but it had been forgotten or 
neglected. It seems that since most of PI's projects are small and with little new technology 
they have familiarized themselves with the shorter version of the project management process, 
which is also the most convenient. 
On the smaller projects that involve known procedures and technology the processes seems to 
work very well. The required documentation, hazard identification and communication are 
present. Before the job is completed pro-ops meetings are conducted where the complete 
operation of the job, checklists, hazards and so on are thoroughly repeated with the operators 
that are going offshore. This ensures that all questions can be answered and everything is 
documented so there is no doubt afterwards to what was agreed upon. The execution is very 
professional and they are in control of all parts of the procedure. 
However, my second concern is the fact that this shorter version of the AMS process is not 
defined anywhere. It is based on thinking that some parts can be excluded and it is up to the 
management to make a qualified decision on what parts this is. This is not a good philosophy 
because the parts that are skipped might differ for each project and in some cases vital 
information can be neglected. It is also difficult to check if the proper content is created when 
you don't know what documentation is required. Even if this seems to work well in practice it 
can be difficult for new or inexperienced employees to keep up with what's happening. Some 
of the employees in PI are relatively new and not that familiar with the processes. It is evident 
that they are very uncertain in how to proceed and are highly reliant of the more experienced 
workers to supply tasks for them. Therefore the management needs to be very alert and 
follow-up the project progress to make sure that nothing is neglected. If this process had been 
standardized it would be much simpler for the project engineers to know what needed to be 
done and execute the proper tasks. This would give them a stronger sense of ownership in the 
project, which most likely would increase the dedication and will to do a good job. It would 
also reduce the amount of time and attention needed by the management. 
   
5.3 Communication 
Good communication and information flow is vital for a project to be executed effectively and 
without errors. This can be a challenge in larger projects with many participants, where it can 
be difficult to make sure that all the participants has received the proper information and that 
they have understood it. Since Pipe Intervention is such a small department this is not a big 
problem. In this project there were incidents where the project engineers got different 
messages from the project manager and the department manager, however since the 
department is so small the miscommunication was rapidly discovered and corrected. 
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When the information is passed orally, from one person to another, the information will 
change because it is not communicated in the exact same way every time. The last person to 
receive the information might not perceive it in the same way as the distributer intended. This 
is especially true when the personnel that are communicating are speaking different languages. 
IK has a very high fraction of personnel that speaks foreign languages and as a result all the 
written and a large part of the oral communication is done in English. This can potentially be a 
source of misunderstanding, but this is not experienced as a problem as all the participants are 
speaking English well and are used to communicate with each other.  
5.3.1 SPOC Single point of contact 
After talking to the employees it became evident that most of the information flows through 
the project manager. He is the main distributer of information and is also the main link 
between the engineering department and the workshop. He keeps track of all the projects, the 
schedules, and the tasks that need to be done. This makes it easier for the mechanics to know 
who to turn to if there is something that needs to be taken care of. If the information is flowing 
through several channels then it is more likely that it isn’t reaching all the recipients that are 
dependent on it. This is not a big problem in PI as it’s such a small department that it’s easy 
for the project manager to keep track of the projects and distribute the information properly. 
However if the department is growing this can become an issue and it might be wise to be 
aware of the importance of a single point of contact.  
5.3.2 Cooperation between engineering and workshop 
There also seems to be an agreement in the fact that there are different ways of thinking in the 
engineering department and in the mechanical department. One is not necessarily better than 
the other only different. In the engineering department there might be more theoretical 
thinking and risk assessment while the mechanics thinks more practical. This difference can be 
a source of great frustration in some cases, if the interface between them is direct without any 
overlay. If the mechanic receives a system that needs to be assembled that he has never seen 
before, he might not understand why it has been designed the way it has. This will also create 
resentment towards the engineering department, because they have little understanding of the 
design process. 
 
If something goes wrong in the workshop and the equipment is not functioning as it was 
supposed to, it’s the mechanics that has to find a solution to the problem. At this point it is 
vital that the engineers are participating in finding a solution and not just disregard the project 
as soon as it has been handed over to the workshop. This can be very frustrating for the 
mechanics because they are the once that have to work overtime to get the system to work 
even if they haven’t participated in the design or even think it is a good solution. This was 
something that was observed in one of the other departments in IK but has not been that 
 37 
 
evident in the PI department. This is probably dependent on the people involved, who all have 
different ways of working. 
This difference in thinking might not only be a bad thing if you are able to exploit it correctly. 
Having different perspectives and ways of thinking can also be a great advantage. By 
including the mechanics earlier in the design process they are more likely to understand the 
design choices being made. They can also contribute with ideas and feedback on how the 
design can be improved so they don’t run into issues in the workshop which could have been 
avoided if it had been discovered earlier in the design phase. This has not been the case in the 
PI department as the mechanics have little or no contact with the engineers during the design 
phase. After talking to the mechanics in the workshop it became evident that they are not 
satisfied with how the projects are managed and the level they are involved in the projects. 
They get a weekly update on what projects are starting, but their participation stops there. 
They are not involved, or consulted in any part of the design and development stages of the 
project. They are not involved in the project until the parts have been ordered and are starting 
to arrive at the workshop. Then it is their job to assemble them and test the solution before it is 
brought offshore for operation. There are many principles that work on paper that just don’t 
work as well in practice. This is something that might be difficult for the engineers to see and 
that the mechanics has a lot of experience in. When they are not included in the design phase 
there might arise issues where parts are not working as well when the concept is tested in 
practice. This will result in a lot of work that has to be redone and the project becomes 
delayed. This could have been avoided if the mechanics had been involved sooner. 
It was also evident that the mechanics did not feel any ownership in the projects they are 
working on. They have not been able to express their opinions or concern about the project 
and is only set to assemble the parts and expected to fix any mistakes made by the engineers. 
There was quite a bit of frustration and they were eager to point out all the things that they 
thought where poorly designed, instead of being proud of the system they were building. As a 
result I noticed that there is a lack of willingness to make the solutions work. There is used 
more energy in talking about how the solution should have been, instead of making the current 
solution work. If it does not work right away, the general attitude is that they knew it wouldn’t 
work and they disregard it as a failure at the first sign of problems, instead of trying to tweak it 
to make it work despite the drawbacks. 
The downside of including mechanics in the design process is that there might be 
disagreement on how the problem should be solved, which will increase the resentment and 
reduce the willingness to cooperate to make the design work. It is therefore important that this 
is managed in a good way to make sure that the two departments are contributing in a way that 
makes all of the participant take ownership in the project and striving to make it perform as 
optimal as possible. 
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5.3.3 Communication with customer offshore  
When talking to the mechanics in the workshop they expressed a major concern about the 
communication with the customer. It is the mechanics that goes offshore to execute the 
operations and if something goes wrong, is not working, or is poorly planned it is the 
mechanics that gets the heat from the client. This might be a hard pill to swallow, especially 
since they have had no say in the development and the planning of the solution. 
 
The engineers also agrees that this is a challenge and worries that the mechanics will have to 
answer for mistakes made by the people onshore without having the proper understanding of 
the reasoning behind it. They also worry that the customer might pressure IK's mechanics to 
deviate from the predetermined procedure to take shortcuts that would benefit them. 
 
As a safety precaution IK has implemented a standard that if the customer has any questions or 
wants to change any of the operational procedures while offshore, this has to be forwarded 
onshore to the project manager. By redirecting the question onshore it becomes more formal, 
and the customer is less likely to want to go through the process, unless it is very important. 
This will also enable IK to go through the required processes to make a prudent response, 
which is reasonable without increasing the risk. 
 
5.4 Documentation 
The documentation is probably one of the issues that PI has the biggest improvement potential 
according to the department manager. As described above in the chapter about work process, 
there have been several steps in the concrete plug that has been poorly executed, but this 
seems to be a bigger issue on the larger projects than the smaller once. On the smaller projects 
the documentation is good and there have been developed proper operation procedures and 
checklists. The representative from DNV, which where revising IK for compliance with 
ISO9000, where also impressed with the fact that the necessary drawings and documentation 
was established even on projects that was very urgent. The biggest challenge seems to lay with 
the bigger projects and my main concern was the fact that there has not been performed any 
risk analysis. 
5.4.1 Risk Analysis 
On the smaller project the test and operational procedures are well known. The operators have 
executed them several times and the equipment has gone through several rounds of 
improvements. Because of this PI knows what the potential dangers are with operating this 
equipment and are very thorough when communicating this in the HAZID meetings with the 
customer, allowing the proper precautions to be made. In my opinion there should be made a 
formal risk analysis for the different procedures and the equipment they are operating. This 
will ensure that all failure modes are evaluated and it makes it easier for new operators to read 
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this document to see which potential risks he is facing. A good example of this is the incident 
in 2008 where the operator unscrewed the saw-support to far. If there had been performed a 
FMECA or a similar risk analysis, it would probably have been detected that this could 
happen. Then the operator would have been aware of the risk or in the best case designers 
could have made stoppers that prevented this from being possible at all. Another advantage is 
to be able to tell the customer that there has been performed a risk analysis on the equipment, 
which might make them more confident in the solution. The operations that PI is performing 
are related to high risk, with big consequences and therefore it is still some skepticism in the 
marked even if the methods are well proven. By being able to show that a proper risk analysis 
has been performed, it can become easier to sell the solution to the customer. 
On the larger projects where new technology is developed it is even more important to 
complete a proper risk analysis. In the case of the Statfjord concrete plug the risk analysis has 
been neglected. When confronted with this the general answer is that the risk is usually 
discussed during the HAZID with the customer. This will uncover any operational hazards and 
conflicts, but in this project there will not be any HAZID because the project is only going to 
be developed at this stage, and the HAZID will probably not be performed until the equipment 
is going to be used. But during the testing it became evident that there are several issues that 
need to be corrected in the design and in the operational process. This caused a lot of wasted 
money and time in materials and manufacturing, and as a result only parts of the operation can 
be displayed to the customer during the FAT. There is no guaranty that performing a risk 
analysis could have avoided these issues, because there is always uncertainty in prototyping 
new equipment, but it could most likely have avoided some of them. 
The risk analysis also has great impact on the interface between the designers and the 
operators. The risk analysis will shed light on all the possible ways that the operator can 
generate wrong input into the system. When this is identified the necessary steps can be taken 
to ensure that the operator is aware of these issues, or the system can be designed to 
compensate for the errors made by the operator. The incident in 2008 is a perfect example of 
this. 
 
5.4.2 Document Quality 
One of my observations was that most of the concept design, risk assessment, testing 
procedures and overall project development are super managed by the specialist 
engineer/department manager. The decisions he makes and the concepts that he develops is 
then passed on to the project engineers. Then it is the project engineer's job to create the proper 
documentation. The result is that the project engineers are only getting fractions of information 
and it becomes difficult for them see the bigger picture and understand all the argumentation 
for the different decision. As a result the documentation becomes fragmented, because the 
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project engineer hasn’t completed the steps himself. He also doesn’t know what steps in the 
project process has been completed and will therefore rely on others to assign tasks to him. 
The project engineer lacks the proper ownership of the project and if he doesn’t have any tasks 
he will simply wait until he is assigned a new on. There is also a lack of verification that the 
project process is being followed. It is mainly the project manager that is responsible for this 
task but there is not any specific approval for the completion of the documentation.  
 
5.5 Uncertainties 
There are several factors that contribute to the uncertainties in this analysis. One of the main 
issues is that there is such a large difference in the projects that is performed at IK that it is 
difficult to evaluate to what extent the same issues are present in all types of projects. An issue 
that arises in one project might not come up in another. This means that this thesis might not 
be able to pick up weaknesses that weren't present in the project that was evaluated, or the 
issues that was pointed out was a one-time incident and is not representative for the normal 
operation. 
Another source of uncertainty is that the project has been executed mainly by inexperienced 
personnel. IK has grown a lot during the last couple years and as a result they have hired a 
number of new employees. The main project engineer on the project that this thesis has 
followed has not been working in IK very long and this was the first project that he has been 
responsible for. This means that the execution of this project might differentiate from the 
norm. The advantage of this is that it is a good opportunity to see if the system is able 
compensate for the lack of experience and function as a guideline to ensure good quality.  
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Chapter 6  
Recommended Solutions 
 
According to Morris (1989) the main interfaces in a project can be found between the different life 
cycles of the project, and in this chapter there will be made some recommendations for how IK can 
improve the interface between the engineering department and the workshop to eliminate unnecessary 
risk factors. These recommendations will then tried to be rooted in existing literature, even if Morris 
(1989) states that interface management is not a well-documented theory. 
Chapanis (1996) explains that human interactions are made with the system throughout its lifetime and 
that all these interactions provide a potential for introducing errors into the system. There are mainly 
three types of people that interact with the system and these are the designers, the operators and the 
maintainers. In this thesis we are looking at the interface between the designer and the operators which 
represent two different parts of the systems lifecycle. As a result the types of mistakes on the different 
sides of the interface are often slightly different. On the engineering side of the interface the mistakes 
are often "latent errors", which Jones (1995) explains is most commonly done by managerial 
personnel. This means that the errors are not identified until later in the lifecycle. On the other side of 
the interface the errors are mostly "active", which means that instant feedback will inform the 
operators if they have made a mistake. 
6.1 Work Process 
After the incident in 2008, one of the major improvements that were made was to implement 
the AMS quality system. This is a very good system that ensures that the necessary steps are 
taken to maintain a high level of quality and risk management. Implementation of new systems 
is rarely received with enthusiasm since it often requires the employees to change established 
procedures. Despite this, it seems like the employees at IK have had a great understanding that 
this type of system was needed and has tried to take as much advantage of it as possible. Even 
if this system is working well there is still room for improvements and as Berger and Kelly 
(2005) states; the first step in interface management is to make clear and concise job 
descriptions. 
6.1.1 Define large and small projects 
As explained earlier there is a common understanding that IK has different types of projects 
that require different types of management and documentation. This is not specified in their 
management system, which means that there is not a proper way of deciding what type of 
documentation and management the project require. These projects should be properly defined 
in order to make sure that there are no confusion or personal opinions on how to proceed. 
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As early as possible in the project, there should be included a step for making a conscious 
decision on what type of project it is going to be and there has to be some predefined 
requirements that needs to be met in order for the project to be qualified as one of the types of 
project. This will make the process more efficient and there is no confusion to what project 
process to follow. This type of standardization would greatly benefit the work. As Lamb and 
Rhodes (2007) states; the standardization of work processes will promote consistent design 
practices and reduce variability and ambiguity. This will have a positive impact on the 
interface between the engineer and mechanics because it makes it easier for the mechanics to 
predict what type of input they will get. As a result it makes it easier for them to plan their 
work and find the information they need. Another important issue with not having properly 
defined work processes that Lamb and Rhodes (2007) emphasize is that new employees must 
make the same mistakes that the more experienced workers have done before them. This 
means that the company is not learning and evolving as the new employees keep making the 
same mistakes as the company has done before. This is very critical in the oil and gas industry 
as making mistakes are not taken lightly when done once, but if the same mistake is done 
twice then it could seriously damage the company's reputation. 
6.1.2 Define what can be skipped in small projects 
The AMS system also provides a good representation of the steps needed to complete the 
projects in a proper manner. Since there is an agreement in IK that not all projects require the 
same level of documentation and management there is a high probability of confusion and 
inconsistency. The AMS should include some information of which steps where mandatory for 
the different types of project. If this is left for each project manager to decide, it is likely that 
you will have as many different project procedures as you have project managers in the 
company. This is because humans interpret risk different, and what seems necessary for one 
person might not be as important for another. This is why this process should be standardized. 
There are a couple of ways to implement this. You can make completely new work process for 
the smaller projects with all its steps, responsibilities and documentation. This solution is very 
time consuming and require some work to be implemented. This solution will make it very 
clear how to proceed in the project and leaves little room for mistakes. Another solution would 
be to properly mark the current project process with the steps that are mandatory in all the 
projects. This is probably the simplest solution as it only requires small modifications, though 
it leaves some possibilities for misreading the procedure.  
6.1.3 Implement routines for checking compliance with AMS 
To make sure that all the necessary steps in the AMS process are completed it would be wise 
incorporate procedures for checking that the necessary steps are completed before you are 
allowed to proceed to the next phase of the project. This is a measure that is implemented in 
other management systems where each step in the process has to be properly closed before the 
next step can be initiated. This will ensure consistency in the projects and eliminate the 
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personal interpretations of what is necessary and reduce the errors introduced in the 
management of the project. 
 
6.2 Communication 
Since the Pipe Intervention department is so small the communication is very good between the 
engineering department and the mechanics. Especially in the testing phase as the engineers are 
spending a lot of time in the workshop to aid the mechanics and to make sure that everything is 
going as planned. The communication is also very good in the operational stage of the project 
even if the engineers are not always present. There are well established procedures that all 
questions and changes requested by the customer is going to be forwarded to the engineers 
onshore to relive the operators from the pressure form the client and to make sure that there are 
made well considered answers from the people that is most familiar with the design of the 
equipment and procedures. As a result the communication across the interface is working very 
well but there is still some potential for improvement that could reduce the risk even further. 
6.2.1 Involve mechanics earlier 
One of the main concerns that were expressed by the mechanics was that they were not involved 
in the project early enough. They often experienced that the things that were designed in the 
engineering department wasn’t functioning as the engineers intended. As a result they got a lot 
of extra work to modify and to make that part fit together. This was something that the guys in 
the workshop believed could be minimized if they had been involved in the process earlier. 
It is also important for the operator to have a good understanding of the equipment he is going 
to operate. Chapanis (1996) explains that designers try to design the systems with good 
intentions with regards to the operability and ergonomics, but in many cases they are not 
successful because they don’t only have to design the system to withstand regular use, but also 
misuse and unintended use. Chapanis (1996) says that there are five different elements that need 
to be taken into consideration when designing a system. These five elements are: Personnel 
selection, personnel training, machine design, job design and environmental design. 
IK is most often designing equipment that is only going to be used by one or two operators. This 
means that it is not effective to use the time and resources that is needed to make the equipment 
user friendly enough to be operated by a large selection of people. They have the advantage that 
they only need to make the equipment fit a small number of people which they are well aware of 
the abilities and limitations of.  According to Chapanis (1996) people are adaptable to operate 
poorly designed equipment, but it would most likely result in more extensive training and stress 
on the operators. In order to avoid this, Sanders and McCormic (1992) explains that the 
identification of the user needs is best done through observation and interviews, so by involving 
the operators in the design process as early as possible it makes sure that the design of the 
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equipment is making sense to the people that are operating it. It will also give the operator a 
better understanding of the equipment that they operating which reduces the risk of human 
errors. 
The supervisor in the workshop suggested that they could have a meeting when the design was 
finished, but before it was sent for production. This is something I agree on as the engineers are 
still in control of the general concept of the project, but they can still make the necessary 
changes if there is discovered any issues or deviations by the mechanics.  
6.2.2 Poorly defined roles can become a challenge at growth 
Since the PI department is such a small department the employees has to take on several roles in 
order to be able to get everything done. This works well as long as the number of participants in 
the project or in the department is relatively small but it can be challenging if the department 
grows further. Berger and Kelly (2005) explain that the first step in interface management is to 
make clear and concise job descriptions, this is especially true if the participants are having 
several roles in the project. In the PI department the department leader also functions as the 
engineering specialist, and the project engineers might function as supervisors and so on. This 
can be challenging and creates a very complex structure with intricate communication channels. 
Berger and Kelly (2005) then state that there needs to be establish standard protocols for critical 
communications. This will bridge the gaps and challenges that are uncovered. It removes the 
uncertainty around the limitations of the different roles, and who is responsible for the required 
processes. This also clarifies the chain of command which makes it easier for the employees to 
know who to consult when decisions need to be made. This mixture of roles is not something 
that seems to be a problem in the projects today, but it might become a problem in the future as 
the department is growing. It is therefore important to be aware of this, so the necessary steps 
can be taken before it becomes a real problem.  
6.3 Documentation 
The documentation in PI is of varying quality. The documents that is most directly affecting the 
interface between the engineering department and the workshop is the technical documents like 
drawings and test procedures. These documents have a very high quality and are also the 
documents that there are spent the most amount of time on.  
The part of the documentation that is more indirectly affecting the interface between the 
engineering department and the workshop is not at the same level of quality. One of the parts of 
the documentation that has been neglected is the risk analysis. The risk evaluation has been 
completed to some extent but only verbally or in the engineering specialists head. This is not a 
very systematic way of doing it and it can be a challenge for the other participants in the project 
because they don’t understand or know what risk evaluation has been done. 
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6.3.1 Risk Analysis on smaller projects 
On the smaller projects most of the equipment and risks are well known and the operator has 
long experience in operating them. There are also performed pre-ops meetings before every 
operation to repeat the common risk factors and other operational issues. As a result the risk is 
minimal, but it could still have been beneficial to create a risk analysis for the equipment. By 
completing a risk assessment like the FMECA for all of the standard equipment that PI has 
developed they could makes sure that no risk enhancing elements are neglected and it makes it 
easier for new operators to read and familiarize themselves with the equipment and the potential 
dangers of operating it. It can also be an advantage in a sales situation as it would help to 
reassure a skeptical client that the necessary risk assessments have been executed. 
6.3.2 Risk Analysis on larger projects 
On the larger projects where new technologies are being developed it should be mandatory to 
perform a risk analysis. According to Kossiakoff, Sweet, Seymour, and Biemer (2011) the risk 
assessment is one of the main processes in system engineering and it is vital when trying to 
balance the risk with the use of new technology. The AMS states that the use of risk analysis 
should be applied, but it is the project manager who decides to what extent. If the difference 
in project types are more clearly defined then it would be easier to set a requirement that a 
risk analysis should be executed if the project is of a certain type. 
Chapanis (1996) mentions Fault Tree Analyses and FMEA as good methods for this task. These 
types of risk assessments would enable the designer to discover problems in the design in an 
early phase of the project. If these mistakes are passed further down the chain, they can have 
very big consequences for the company. By sending faulty equipment to manufacturing it will 
cost a lot of money to correct afterwards and it will most likely affect the schedule. 
As Jones (1995) explains the errors that are made in the design phase can either be "active" or 
"latent". The "active" errors are the most common and the easiest to discover as these will have 
a direct effect on the function of the system. This could be design issues that makes it 
impossible or difficult to make the different parts of the system fit together, or the system might 
simply not work. The mechanics in PI have expressed some frustration that there are simple 
mistakes that has been done in the design phase that creates a lot of problems for them, which 
could have been avoided if they had been discovered before the parts arrived at the workshop. 
An example of this is the Statfjord A concrete plug where the locking mechanism of the 
plugging train simply didn’t fit its housing because the surface finish was too coarse. Luckily 
the mechanics was able to modify it so it fit, or else they would have to buy a new one. This 
type of rework costs a lot of money and takes a lot of extra time which can affect the schedule, 
which is not well received by the customer. 
The "latent" errors are more difficult to discover because the system might not fail because of it. 
This means that the system is able to functions but there might be certain circumstances that 
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might trigger an error, or it might only function when compensating measures are applied to 
make it work. This is a very big risk because even if the error is discovered it is often decided 
that it is too expensive to correct it, since the system is functioning. As a result the equipment is 
operated with weaknesses that have a high probability of making the system fail if the operator 
is unaware of it, or neglects it. A good example of this is the incident in 2008, were there was a 
weakness in the saw-supports, as it was possible to completely unscrew them. The operator 
unscrewed the saw-supports to make sure that the brush could pass them when it was inserted in 
the pipe. This was a logical thing to do, but it had not been done during the FAT. As a result this 
potential error was not discovered until it failed during operation. If a risk analysis had been 
completed this would probably have been identified as a potential issue and the proper measures 
could have been implemented. This could have been done by implementing a procedure for how 
far it would be safe to unscrew the saw supports before they failed, but the most ideal solution 
would be to design some stoppers which made unscrewing them impossible. Today these saw 
supports have been designed out completely and other measures for centering the saw has been 
implemented. 
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Chapter 7  
Discussion 
 
7.1 Main Goals 
After the incident in 2008 IK identified the interface between the engineering department and 
the workshop as one of the areas with the biggest improvement potential in regards to reducing 
the risk of unwanted incidents. As a result this thesis was initiated to evaluate this interface 
based on the following three key factors:  
 Work Process 
 Communication 
 Documentation 
The thesis was initially going to be a general study for all the departments in IK, but after some 
research it became evident that it would be comprehensive as there were large differences in the 
operation. Thus the thesis was limited to concentrate on the Pipe Intervention department. Even 
if the study has been focused on only one department some of the recommended improvements 
are related to IK's governing documents and would affect all the other departments as well. 
7.1.1 What did I do? 
To be able to properly evaluate the interface between the interface between the engineering 
department and the workshop based on the three factors an Abductive strategy was chosen. As 
Blaikie (2000) explains, this means that the analyst needs to take and objective approach, by 
following the company to learn their way of thinking, before a technical explanation is 
established based on existing literature and established methods. This is a strategy that is a bit 
challenging as it takes a lot of time to learn and fully understand the operational procedures, and 
map all the channels of information and communication that exists within the company.  
To be able to evaluate the work process in IK the first part of the project was used to participate 
in ongoing projects to see how the employees are cooperating and communicating. This also 
presented the opportunity to get to know the employees in both the engineering department and 
in the workshop. Relevant personnel was also interviewed to identify what they experienced as 
challenging in relation to the interface and what was going well. This was considered the most 
suitable way of retrieving the information as the number of employees is so small. 
7.1.2 What did I find out? 
After the incident in 2008, IK's reputation was impaired and a little skepticism was introduced 
in the marked for operating on live pipes. As a result IK had to make some drastic changes in 
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order to ensure the customers that they were able to operate safely and took the necessary 
precautions to improve themselves and to learn from their mistakes. As a result the operation 
has improved a lot since then and today they have a very quality and safety minded operation, 
where they are constantly trying to improve themselves. To be able to accomplish this, the most 
important thing is to learn from your mistakes. Lamb and Rhodes (2007) explain that by 
standardizing best practice, you can avoid the same mistakes from happening again. This is why 
IK has implemented their management system (AMS) to make sure that the necessary steps are 
taken in the project to avoid making the same mistakes again. However, in IK there is a 
common understanding that some of the steps in the operational procedure can be neglected on 
the smaller projects. This is a very serious issue as you are bypassing the measures that are 
implemented to make sure that you are not making any errors. This is the same thing as 
happened in the Chernobyl accident in 1986. Von Glinow and Mohrman(1990) explains that the 
engineers working in Chernobyl removed all the safety systems to do some tests on the 
generators, to see how low they could be run and still provide power for the cores cooling 
system. During this test the operators lost control of the core, and since all the safety systems 
were deactivated, it resulted in a large explosion with major airborne release of radioactive 
material. Therefore it is vital that the safety systems are not bypassed without the proper 
understanding of consequences and therefore the quality process needs to be properly defined 
for all the different scenarios in IK's operation.  
Another key factor for avoiding operational errors is to ensure good communication throughout 
the project. Berger and Kelly (2005) explain that ensuring communication across the interfaces 
in a project is vital for timely and effective operation as it minimizes the number of mistakes 
that causes waste of time and money in the sense of rework. According to Morris (1989) the 
main interfaces in a project can be found between the different life cycles of the project. This 
complies with the conclusions IK has drawn that their most critical interface is between the 
engineering department and the workshop. As this thesis has discovered there are two types of 
errors that can occur in this interface. The first type is when all the parts are manufactured and 
assembled correctly but the system is not functioning as well as expected, or not at all. This is a 
common situation when building prototypes as it is impossible to overcome all the uncertainty 
that is related to a project, when there is little or no prior knowledge on the subject. Kossiakoff, 
Sweet, Seymour, and Biemer (2011) tell us that system engineering is vital in balancing risk of 
uncertainty and the use of new technology. A common way of handling these types of risks are 
according to Chapanis (1996) to use tools like FMEA or FTA. This is also supported by Jones 
(1995) statement that a "Well defined problem yields a well-defined solution".   
The other type of error that was observed was errors where the actual manufacturing or 
assembly wasn’t performed as the designer intended. This means that the drawing for the 
manufacturer was wrong or the mechanics have assembled them in the wrong order. As a result 
the parts often need to be modified, reassembled, or completely remanufactured. This takes a lot 
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of time and cost a lot of money, which affects the bottom line of the project and the customer’s 
satisfaction. These mistakes are very easy to discover as their effects are immediate, but they are 
more difficult to prevent. The supervisor at IK believes that by involving them earlier in the 
project some of these issues could be discovered earlier, since they have a slightly different 
point of view and are more likely to discover errors that might become a challenge during the 
assembly and operation of the equipment.  
7.2 Further Research 
In the oil and gas industry it is very important to keep improving the risk management. This 
thesis only cover a small part of the potential improvement potential that exist in in the company 
for reducing risk and further research that supports this would always be encouraged.  
To be little more specific, further research to improve the risk management in IK could include: 
 Similar studies that cover the risk factors in the interface between engineering and 
workshop in other departments 
 It would also be beneficial to see what effects the implementation of the recommended 
improvements would have over time. 
Because of time limitations and significant difference in operation between the departments, this 
thesis only evaluated the interface between the engineering department and the workshop in the 
Pipe Intervention department. There are probably similar issues in the other departments as 
well, which would be beneficial for the company to highlight.  
After implementation of the improvements suggested in this thesis it would be very rewarding 
to see the effects over time. This is something that is very difficult to measure, but it could 
provide valuable information on the improvements in risk reduction. 
 
7.3 Challenges 
According to Morris (1989), interface management isn’t a very well documented theory and that 
it is mostly a way of looking at project management. This made this thesis a little bit 
challenging as there was not any good literature on how to evaluate or implement interface 
management. This meant that in the beginning of the project there were used a lot of time trying 
to find the best suited way to evaluate this interface and what factors where the most relevant to 
look at. The basis of the thesis had to be supported by other similar subjects that were concerned 
with project management and human interactions and to see what had the biggest impact on the 
interface. As a result the literature study became very general and not very specific for the 
subject of the thesis, but it covered general concepts that are relevant in all parts of project 
management, but that could be used to support the issues that were discovered as a challenge in 
the thesis. 
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The thesis has chosen to follow a larger project taken on by the Pipe Intervention department, 
which was to create a concept for a concrete plug in the ballast water lines in the utility shaft at 
Statfjord A. This project is a relatively large project compared to the projects that are usually 
taken on by the department. Thus the execution of the project might not be representative for the 
daily operation in the department. However, it also presents a great opportunity to test the 
quality system to see if it manages to maintain the quality of the execution even if this is not a 
common working situation for the employees. 
At the beginning of this thesis this was going to be a general study of the Pipe Intervention, 
where the results then would be applied to all of the departments. This proved to be a bigger 
challenge than first expected, since the different departments are very different in types of 
projects, size and structure of departments. As a result most of the recommendations will be 
specific to the Pipe Intervention department, but the improvement of the Antenor management 
system would be beneficial to the whole company. 
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Chapter 8  
Conclusion 
 
The thesis has evaluated IK's interface between the engineering department and the workshop based 
on all the key factors that was described in the beginning of the thesis. The thesis concludes that IK 
has had major improvements in their operations regarding risk and safety since the incident in 2008. 
The measures that were implemented afterwards has been very effective and taken the operation to a 
whole new level. The biggest improvement has probably been the change in mentality as IK has gone 
from a small company that didn’t dear to challenge the client and to think that everything is probably 
going to be fine, to a company that sets requirement for the clients and that demands nothing short of 
the lowest risk possible. 
The thesis has evaluated the interface based on three key factors: Work process, communication and 
documentation and has found improvement potential within all three. The biggest improvement 
potential is probably within their work process. The thesis suggests that the work process within IK's 
quality system could be improved by properly defining the different alternatives the project managers 
have, and the decisions that needs to be made. The thesis also suggests that IK could benefit from 
including the mechanics earlier in the projects and to standardizing the use of risk analysis, to make 
sure that this is prioritized and performed in a professional manner. 
All of the measures that has been suggested are relatively easy to implement and will have a positive 
impact on IK's operation. They will reduce the operational risk of accident that could lead to injuries, 
environmental damages and loss of reputation, which supports IK's ambition of having quality and 
safety inherent in production and operation. The suggestions will also reduce the risk of errors in the 
project phase, which will reduce the cost of rework and waste of time, which supports IK's goal of 
being efficient and result driven from design to execution.  
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Appendix 
Appendix A – Warning from the petroleum authorities 
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